Last Thursday, August 20, 2026, the Times of Israel liveblog carried four headlines within a few hours: the American president announcing sanctions against any country that does business with Iran, the United Arab Emirates imposing a financial embargo on Tehran, the government of Yemen warning that the Houthis are preparing to seize the Bab el-Mandeb strait, and Israel bombing an air base in Syria after warning Turkey.
Anyone who reads this without context understands only one thing: they hate each other. And then comes the lazy explanation repeated at every bar table and from many a pulpit, that this is an age-old hatred between peoples who have always fought. But is it?
Did you know that this conflict between the present-day State of Israel and Iran is only 47 years old, and not millennia old? In fact, before it, the two countries were very close partners for three decades. The rupture has a date, a cause, names and people responsible, and almost all of it can be verified in public documents. Let us do what the Bereans would do, examining each claim, and at the end we will see what Scripture actually says about that land, which is quite different from what people usually say it says. I wrote everything in plain language, on purpose. Whoever understands a subject does not need difficult words to explain it.
Who is who, before any opinion
Israel and Iran do not share a border · There are 1,500 kilometers and three countries between them
Israel and Iran are two countries in the Middle East, but they do not share a border. Between them lie more than 1,500 kilometers in a straight line and other countries in the middle: Jordan, Syria and Iraq. That is roughly the distance from São Paulo to Salvador (two cities in Brazil). They are also very different in size. Israel has about 22,000 square kilometers, almost exactly the size of Sergipe, the smallest Brazilian state, and only about 10 million inhabitants. Iran has 1.6 million square kilometers, some 75 times more, and about 90 million inhabitants. And there is a third difference, the least known and the most important: they are not just two different countries, they are two different worlds. Israel is a Jewish state. Iran is not Arab, it is Persian.
Arab, Persian, Muslim · Three words that do not mean the same thing
The confusion comes from mixing two things of different natures. Muslim is a religion. Arab and Persian are peoples. Someone can be Muslim and not be Arab, as is the case with Iranians. It is the same difference there is between “Christian” and “Brazilian.” Christian is what you believe; Brazilian is where you come from. You can be Brazilian and Christian, Brazilian and atheist, Christian and Korean. They are independent questions, with independent answers. So do not mix things up. Therefore, an Arab may not be Muslim, and a Muslim may not be Arab. Both happen all the time, in enormous numbers.
Arabs are the peoples who speak Arabic and share that cultural heritage. They originated in the Arabian Peninsula, made up today of seven countries: Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait. But with the Islamic expansion from the seventh century on, the Arabic language and culture spread across the Middle East and North Africa, so that today there are twenty-two Arab countries, and Egypt alone has more Arabic speakers than the whole peninsula combined. Persians are the people of the Iranian plateau, whose language is Persian, which they call Farsi. Arabic belongs to the Semitic language family, the same as Hebrew. Persian belongs to the Indo-European language family, the same as Portuguese, Spanish, English, Greek and Latin. In plain terms: Persian is a cousin of Portuguese (and of English), and Arabic is not. You can see it in the most basic words of all.
| Portuguese | Persian | Latin |
|---|---|---|
| pai (father) | pedar | pater |
| mãe (mother) | mādar | mater |
| irmão (brother) | barādar | frater |
| nome (name) | nām | nomen |
| dois (two) | do | duo |
It is neither coincidence nor borrowing. These are words descended from the same ancestor, long before Islam existed. When the Islamic armies conquered Persia, between 636 and 651, toppling the Sasanian Empire, the Persians adopted the Arabic alphabet to write their own language. But the Persians never forgot who they were. They changed religion, but kept their language, their calendar and their festivals. An Iranian is proud of descending from Cyrus and Darius, kings of the Medes and Persians, and that sets him apart from his Arab neighbors every day.
The last part of the confusion still has to be knocked down. The four countries with the most Muslims in the world are, in this order: Indonesia, with about 239 million, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. None of the four is Arab. None is in the Middle East. None speaks Arabic in daily life. If someone pictures the typical Muslim as a man in a turban in the Arabian desert, he is picturing the minority. The typical Muslim is Asian. So understanding these basic premises is essential to understanding the conflict.
Sunnis and Shiites · The split did not begin over God, it began over who is in charge
Here is the heart of the matter, and you need to understand this history, which is simpler than it looks. The prophet Muhammad died in AD 632 and left an enormous problem unanswered: who is in charge now? Two groups then formed. The first group said that the most capable among his companions should be chosen, and the one chosen was Abu Bakr, Muhammad’s father-in-law. This group became the Sunnis, a word that comes from sunna, the way, the custom of the Prophet. They are, therefore, “the people of tradition.” The second group said that command belonged to his family, and the family was Ali, Muhammad’s cousin, married to Fatima, his daughter. This group became the Shiites, a word that comes from shiat Ali and literally means “the party of Ali”. Notice: the split did not begin because of God, nor the Quran, nor doctrine. It began because of who has the right to rule. It was a succession dispute, the kind that happens when a family divides an estate. Except that it lasted 1,400 years, and in that time it became two distinct religious cultures. In other words, both are Muslims, but of different currents within Islam; somewhat like, to help you understand, the difference between Catholics and Protestants, where both are Christians, but each group understands differently how doctrine should be read.
But in practice, what changes between being Sunni and being Shiite? The most important difference is not in the Quran, which is the same for both, but in who has the authority to interpret it. Sunnism, for example, has no clergy. An imam, there, is only the one who leads the prayer, and he can be any educated man of the community. Authority lies in the texts and in the accumulated consensus of the scholars. No one speaks in the name of God, because no one holds an office for that. Shiism, by contrast, built the opposite: a real hierarchy, with the ayatollahs at the top. Each believer chooses a marja, a term that means model for imitation, and follows his guidance in matters of faith and conduct. Keep this difference in mind, because it explains Iran.
In numbers, Shiites are ten to thirteen percent of Muslims. They are the majority in only four countries: Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Bahrain, and they form the largest community in Lebanon. All the rest of the Islamic world is mostly Sunni. To sum it up in one sentence: the Sunni asks what tradition has established; the Shiite asks what the legitimate guide, living and present, determines.
Karbala, 680 · Seventy people surrounded without water, and the memory that shaped Iran
In AD 680, only 48 years after Muhammad’s death, in the city of Karbala, in present-day Iraq, Hussein, son of Ali (from whom the Shiites take their origin, as I said above) and grandson of Muhammad, marched against the caliph of the time with a handful of relatives and followers. It is important to clarify that caliph comes from the Arabic khalifa, which means successor. He would be Muhammad’s successor in command of the Muslim community. The caliph governs, collects taxes, commands armies. He is closer to an “emperor with religious legitimacy” than to a pope. The caliph of 680 was Yazid. His father, Muawiya, had done something unprecedented: he named his own son as his successor. The caliphate, which until then had been decided by choice among the Prophet’s companions, became a hereditary monarchy at a single stroke. Yazid had a reputation as a worldly man, indifferent to religion, and for many he was living proof that the office had been corrupted. Hussein therefore refused to swear allegiance to him. He was in Mecca when letters began arriving from the inhabitants of Kufa, a city in the south of present-day Iraq that had been the capital of his father Ali. They promised armed support and asked him to come and lead the revolt. He set out with about seventy people, among them women and children of his own family, which says everything about what he expected to find: a welcome, not a war. On the way, Yazid crushed the movement in Kufa and sent troops to intercept him. Hussein was surrounded, went days without water and was massacred with almost everyone who was with him. This is the so-called Battle of Karbala. Karbala is, therefore, for Shiites, the founding memory: the righteous man murdered by the powerful. Every year, on the date called Ashura, millions of Shiites hold mourning processions, weep in public, beat their chests, and in some places even wound themselves on purpose to share in his suffering. To understand this is to understand Iran. Shiite identity was thus built around three ideas: injustice suffered, the faithful minority against the powerful majority, and the value of martyrdom.
The imam who vanished in 874 · And the question Shiism went a thousand years without answering
The Shiites of Iran belong to a branch called Twelver, that is, “of the twelve.” They believe there were twelve leaders chosen by God, descendants of Ali (Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law), called imams. And the twelfth leader, called the Mahdi, disappeared while still a child, in AD 874. They believe he did not die: he is hidden, alive, and will return at the end of time to establish justice. Now see the problem this creates. If the true leader is hidden and will return, who governs until he returns? The traditional answer, for more than a thousand years, was: no one from the clergy governs; we wait and give guidance.
A blue island in a red ocean · Why Iran is a minority twice over at the same time
Sunnis are between 87% and 90% of the world’s Muslims. Shiites are between 10% and 13%. The Shiite-majority countries are few: Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Bahrain, plus a very large population in Lebanon. Iran is a blue island in a red ocean. And add up the two things we have seen: Iran is Persian in an Arab neighborhood and Shiite in a religion that is 90% Sunni. It is a minority twice over, at the same time, and it resembles no one in either dimension. A country in these conditions cannot lead the Middle East either through its people or through its religion. It would need something else. And, in 1979, it found it.
There is also a practical difference between Sunnis and Shiites that is almost never mentioned and that is worth its weight in gold for understanding the Iranian revolution. Shiites have an organized religious hierarchy, with seminaries, titles and a ladder of authority that ends at the grand ayatollahs, and each believer chooses a leader to follow and pays him a religious contribution. Sunnis have none of this: there is no ordination, no central hierarchy, no ladder of titles. From this follows something enormous. The Iranian revolution was possible only because the Shiite clergy was already a ready-made institution, with chiefs, buildings, its own money and a network that reached every neighborhood.
How two partners became mortal enemies
1950 · Iran was the second Muslim country to recognize Israel, and became its oil supplier
In 1950, Iran was the second Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel, right after Turkey. And it was not a formal gesture: it was a real partnership, which lasted almost thirty years. The logic of David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s founding prime minister, was called the periphery doctrine. Surrounded by hostile Arab states, Israel went looking for allies in the outer ring, among the neighbors of its neighbors, who were not Arab and had their own reasons to fear Arab nationalism: Turkey, Ethiopia, the Kurds and, above all, Iran. The result was deep cooperation. With the Arab boycott cutting off supplies, Iran became Israel’s main oil supplier, with the oil carried through the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline, operated jointly by the two. There was an exchange of intelligence between the Mossad and the Iranian secret police, joint military projects and permanent diplomatic representation in Tehran, the capital of Iran. In other words, the right question is what happened in 1979 that turned two partners into mortal enemies.
Shah · The Persian word for king is hidden in the name of Xerxes, the Ahasuerus of Esther
At that time Iran was a monarchy. In Persian, the word for king is shah. The word comes from Old Persian, and there is a detail here that matters to anyone who reads Scripture: the same root is in the name of Xerxes, the Ahasuerus of the book of Esther, which in Old Persian is “he who rules over heroes.” When the Bible speaks of the king of Persia, the word behind it is the grandmother of “shah.” The full title of the ancient Persian kings was shah of shahs, king of kings, a formula that Cyrus and Darius used.
Now the point almost no one knows: the monarchy overthrown in 1979, the event that started the rift with Israel, was not an ancient monarchy. The reign of the Pahlavi dynasty lasted only 54 years and had two kings. Reza Khan was an officer in a military brigade; he seized power in a coup in 1921 and crowned himself shah in 1925. His son, Mohammad Reza, reigned from 1941 to 1979. This last shah was an ally of the United States and wanted to modernize the country quickly. It is from this period that the old photos of Iran come, and whoever sees them is surprised by its Westernization and its freedom of dress and culture, with women wearing bikinis and driving in complete freedom.
1953 · The CIA overthrew Iran’s elected prime minister, and admitted it sixty years later
In 1951, Iran had an elected prime minister named Mohammad Mossadegh. He did something enormously popular: he decided that Iran’s oil belonged to Iran, and not to a British company that profited from it. This is called nationalizing. London was furious. And on August 19, 1953, the secret services of the United States and Britain overthrew this minister, Mossadegh, and gave absolute power back to the shah. The operation was called TPAJAX and was directed by Kermit Roosevelt Jr., grandson of the American president Theodore Roosevelt. The CIA itself officially acknowledged it in 2013, with documents released to the public.
Now imagine what this means for an ordinary Iranian. The country had a government chosen by the people, and foreign powers swapped it for a monarch who obeyed them. From then on there began, for millions of people, the feeling that the shah of the time, Mohammad Reza, was not the king of Iran: he was the Americans’ employee. That resentment did not disappear. It was stored up for 26 years, and then it exploded.
Who Khomeini was · He was past sixty and still teaching ethics and writing poetry
Ruhollah Khomeini was born in 1902 in a small town called Khomein, and his surname is literally the name of the town. He was a cleric, an ayatollah, the title of the highest leaders of Shiism, a spiritual leader. Until he was 60 years old he was not a political figure. He was a seminary teacher; he taught ethics and Islamic philosophy and wrote poetry. What he developed, and what is the key to everything, is called velayat-e faqih, the guardianship of the Islamic jurist. The thesis is this: the one who should govern a country is neither a king nor an elected parliament, but the most qualified religious jurist, with full political authority. He developed this in lectures given in exile, in Najaf, around 1970. He did not say his own name, but he stressed that the most qualified religious leader is the one who would be the best ruler.
And here something must be said plainly, something that almost never appears in the news: this reasoning of Khomeini’s is a minority innovation even within Shiism itself. Remember the tradition we saw, that the clergy guides but does not govern until the Mahdi returns1? That was the dominant position. Grand ayatollahs of the time disagreed with Khomeini. Khomeini was not applying “what Shiite Islam teaches.” He was proposing a new thesis, contested by his peers; nevertheless, he won the dispute.
How the shah fell · He closed every place where people could complain, except the mosque
It was not a coup. It was a chain of mistakes by the shah himself, Mohammad Reza. In 1963, he launched the so-called White Revolution, with land reform, women’s suffrage and secularization. Khomeini attacked these measures in public2. There was a revolt in June, with hundreds dead. In 1964 came the fatal mistake. Parliament passed the capitulations law, granting judicial immunity to American military personnel and their dependents on Iranian soil: in other words, if an American committed a crime in Iran, Iranian courts could not try him. Khomeini gave the speech that made his name, saying they had lowered the Iranian people below an American dog. He was arrested and expelled from the country. He spent fourteen years abroad, in Turkey, then in Iraq and finally in France. Note well: Khomeini’s political rise is born tied to a concrete anti-American grievance, and not to an abstract theory about the West.
And now the structural cause, the most important of all and the one that is rarely taught. SAVAK, the shah’s police, crushed all secular opposition: communists, nationalists, liberals, unions, the press. It shut everything down. There was only one thing it could not shut down, because shutting it would be a religious scandal: the mosque.
Think calmly about what this produces. If you shut down every place where people can complain, except one, where do the discontented go? To the only one left. The shah was not overthrown by the clerics in spite of the repression. He was overthrown by the clerics because of the repression. He himself chose who would replace him, without realizing he was choosing.
The rest was quick. Khomeini’s sermons entered the country on cassette tapes copied from hand to hand, in the first revolution made with pocket technology, long before the internet. In January 1978, an official newspaper published an insulting article against him, and the protests began in Qom. Then a remarkable mechanism came into play: Shiite mourning is fulfilled in forty days, so each round of deaths generated a demonstration forty days later, which generated more deaths, which generated the next demonstration. The religious calendar became an engine of mobilization. In September came Black Friday, with the army firing on the crowd in Jaleh Square. In the autumn, the oil workers went on strike and cut off the state’s revenue. On January 16, 1979, the shah left the country, heading for the United States, sick with cancer. On February 1, Khomeini landed in Tehran before huge crowds. On February 11, the army declared itself neutral, and it was over.
Did he become the new shah? · No: he created an office with more power than the shah ever had
No. And that is even more interesting than if he had. The monarchy was abolished. On March 30 and 31, 1979, there was a single-question referendum, yes or no to the Islamic Republic, approved with 98.2%. Khomeini took office as Supreme Leader, the guardian-jurist of his own doctrine. Except that the office he created has more power than the shah’s ever had. The Supreme Leader commands the armed forces, appoints the head of the judiciary, chooses half of the Guardian Council, names the commanders of the Revolutionary Guard and the head of state media. And the council he appoints decides who may run for president. The people vote, but only for the names he allowed onto the list. It is absolute monarchy with a religious foundation. And, after taking power, Khomeini did what revolutions usually do: he devoured his own allies. Liberals, nationalists and leftists had fought alongside him against the shah; within two years they were imprisoned, exiled or dead.
Why does Iran hate the United States and Israel? · It did not come out of nowhere, and there are four layers
It did not come out of nowhere.
Against the United States, the reason has a name and a date: 1953. They overthrew an elected government over oil and propped up for 26 years a dictator who tortured opponents, besides granting judicial immunity to their own military personnel on Iranian soil. None of this justifies what the regime did afterward, but it explains why the accusation stuck to an entire people, including people who were not religious.
Against Israel, there are four layers added together. The first is that Israel was a partner of the overthrown regime: an ally of the shah, an arms supplier, a partner of the secret police, a buyer of oil. For those who hated the shah, Israel was not a distant country; it was co-owner of the machine that tortured them. The second is ideological and predates power, and here one must understand exactly what Khomeini said. From 1963 on he did not merely criticize Israel: he said Israel was the cause. Pure antisemitism. In his speeches, the land reform that struck religious lands appeared as an Israeli project carried out by the shah, with the aim of eliminating the clergy, because the clergy would be the obstacle. Israel does not want there to be ulama (scholars trained in the study of the Quran) in this country, he claimed. The third is the coldest, and it is pure arithmetic. A Persian and Shiite state does not lead an Arab and Sunni Middle East by affinity, because it has none. It needed a banner that would cross both divides, and the Palestinian cause was the only one available. That is why Khomeini created Jerusalem Day as early as 1979 and handed the building of the Israeli embassy in Tehran over to the Palestine Liberation Organization.
The war that has lasted until today
1982 · Iran discovered it is cheaper to pay those who fight than to fight
In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon. In southern Lebanon there were many Shiites. So Iran did something that would redraw the conflict: it sent about 1,500 Revolutionary Guard instructors to the Beqaa Valley, where they trained, armed and organized a new militia. Hezbollah was born. In other words, understand what was invented there. Iran does not fight Israel. Iran builds, trains and pays those who fight. It is as if, in a schoolyard fight, instead of throwing punches yourself, you paid students from other classes to fight for you. This brings two cruel advantages: it is cheap, because the one who gets hurt is always someone else, and it is almost impossible to end, because there is no single person with whom to make peace.
But why did Iran meddle, instead of staying neutral? Because neutrality brought no gain and cost a great deal. There was a ready population: the Shiites of southern Lebanon were the poorest and most politically marginalized community in the country, in a system that divided power between Maronites and Sunnis, and they had been organizing since the 1970s. They were exactly the ones living under the occupation. Iran did not create a client out of nothing; it found an available and resentful base, Shiite like itself. There was also doctrine: the 1979 Constitution does not define Iran as an ordinary state looking after its own interests, and Article 154 speaks of supporting the struggle of the oppressed anywhere in the world. Khomeini had overthrown the shah by accusing him of submission to foreigners; to watch with folded arms while Israel occupied Shiites would be to admit being the same kind of state he claimed to have destroyed.
And there was the cold calculation, which is the most decisive. Since 1980 Iran had been at war with Iraq, which had invaded with American, European and Gulf monarchy support. It was surrounded and had no state allies. Building a non-state force in Lebanon was cheap, deniable and created strategic depth far from its own borders. At the same time it solved the problem of the third layer: Egypt had signed peace with Israel in 1979 and the Palestine Liberation Organization had been expelled from Beirut in 1982, so there was an open vacancy for whoever would really confront Israel, and Iran filled it. In the end, for a fraction of the price of an army, Iran gained a border with Israel without having a border with Israel.
Over time Iran built a whole network like this, which they call the Axis of Resistance: Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, militias in Iraq and the government of Syria as a land bridge.
And look at the map of the allies: Hezbollah is Shiite, the Iraqi militias are Shiite, the Houthis come from a branch of Shiism, and the Assad government came from a related group. The map of Iranian influence is almost the map of Shiism. The exception is Hamas, which is Sunni, and the exception proves the rule: Iran funds a Sunni group because Palestine is exactly the bridge that crosses the religious divide.
What about the atomic bomb? · The Americans started Iran’s nuclear program in 1957
Let us begin with the irony nobody mentions: Iran’s nuclear program was started by the Americans, in 1957, with the shah, within the Atoms for Peace program. The West planted what it bombs today.
To understand why this is serious, you need to know what enriching uranium means. Uranium taken from the ground is a mixture in which only a tiny portion is usable. Enriching is separating out that usable portion. For a power plant, reaching about 4% is enough. For a bomb, you need to reach about 90%. Now the number at the center of today’s fight: Iran has accumulated 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, and it is the only country without nuclear weapons that has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty to have reached that level. Sixty percent seems far from ninety, but it is not. The heavy work is in the first stages. Reaching 60% is like climbing 90% of the mountain: what is left is the short stretch at the end. With that amount one could produce something around ten devices.
And why does Israel react as it does? Go back to the numbers from the beginning. Israel is the size of Sergipe and almost its entire population is concentrated in a few cities. In an atomic war, Iran would lose cities and go on existing as a country. Israel would not. One of the two can lose only once. You do not need to agree with what Israel does to understand that it calculates from there.
Did Israel only defend itself? · The honest answer is that both attacked, in very distinct phases
Honest answer: both attacked, at different times, and there are three very distinct phases.
From 1979 to around 1990, Israel did not attack Iran. It even sold weapons to Khomeini’s regime during the war against Iraq, in the operation that would later lead to the Iran-Contra scandal3, because at that moment Saddam Hussein was closer and more dangerous. The enmity was Iranian rhetoric, and Israel calculated by interest.
In the 1990s came the turn. Within a few years Israel’s historic enemies left the board: Egypt had already made peace in 1979, the Soviet Union fell in 1991 and with it the military sponsorship of the Arab regimes, and Iraq was defeated in the Gulf War and placed under sanctions. For the first time in forty years there was no Arab front capable of threatening Israel conventionally. It was then that the government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin made two decisions that depended on each other: closing the near front, negotiating with the Palestinians in Oslo, in 1993, and with Jordan, in 1994; and naming the far front, designating Iran as the strategic threat of the new era. The two went together because, in Israeli doctrine, you must know who the main enemy is in order to know with whom you can make a deal: with Iran in the place of central threat, the Palestinians ceased to be a strategic problem and became a manageable problem. There was also the argument for Washington: if the real danger was Iran, then Palestinian peace was in the Americans’ interest.
On the Iranian side, the agreement between Israel and the Palestinians in Oslo was a direct threat: if the Palestinians signed peace, Iran would lose the only banner capable of crossing the Persian-Arab and Shiite-Sunni divides, and with it the regional leadership it had been building since 1979. Hence the logic of what came next: strike far away, deniably, without exposing itself to military retaliation, showing that the war went on. In other words, for the Iranian government the war made complete sense and needed to continue within the Palestinian conflict. And for that the conflict left the Middle East. The Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires was attacked in 1992, with 29 dead, and the AMIA Jewish community center in 1994, with 85 dead, both while the peace process was in full force. Argentina was not a random choice: it had the largest Jewish community in Latin America, an established Hezbollah presence in the Tri-Border Area (where Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay meet) and a state with fragile investigative capacity. In April 2024, Argentina’s highest criminal court formally held Iran and Hezbollah responsible for both attacks and classified them as crimes against humanity. Iran denies it to this day.
From 2010 on, Israel is a very active party. The Stuxnet virus, which destroyed centrifuges at Natanz. The assassination of at least five Iranian nuclear scientists between 2010 and 2020. The theft, by the Mossad in 2018, of half a ton of documents from the nuclear archive inside Tehran. Hundreds of strikes on Iranian positions in Syria. And, above all, on April 1, 2024, Israel bombed the Iranian consular annex in Damascus, the capital of Syria, killing a Revolutionary Guard general. It was this attack that provoked, thirteen days later, the first direct attack by Iran on Israel in 45 years.
The fair conclusion, therefore, has two halves. Iran built the whole architecture of hostility and has been the ideological aggressor since 1979; and Israel, from the 1990s on, became an active defender.
From 2023 to 2026 · The year Iran lost Hezbollah, Syria and its own Supreme Leader
After the terrible Hamas attack in October 2023, the whole Iranian network went into action at once. And it was then that Iran began to lose everything. In April 2024 came the first direct attack from Iranian territory against Israel, repeated in October. The unwritten rule that the two would never attack each other head-on ended there. The head of Hezbollah was killed in September 2024. Assad’s Syrian government fell in December 2024, cutting the land bridge by which Iranian weapons reached Lebanon. And from June 13 to 24, 2025 came the Twelve-Day War, with Israel striking the Iranian high command and the United States bombing the nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan on June 22.
Then, on February 28, 2026, came the biggest attack of all. In Operation Epic Fury, the Americans and Israelis carried out about 900 strikes in twelve hours. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed, along with dozens of commanders.
Iran retaliated against embassies, military bases and oil facilities, and tried to close the Strait of Hormuz4. The price of a barrel jumped from about 70 to 103 dollars. There was a ceasefire on April 8 and a memorandum signed on June 17 by American president Donald Trump and Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian, with sixty days to negotiate the nuclear file. It collapsed on July 6 and 7, when Iran attacked three commercial ships.
Why are they fighting today? · Five reasons, and one of them is the order of steps in an inspection
Five things at once, and all of them with a precise address.
First: the 440 kilograms of uranium. Since June 2025 international inspectors have not entered Iran. No one outside knows where that material is. And the negotiation stalled on a detail that seems bureaucratic and is not: the atomic agency wants to inspect as part of an interim agreement, and Tehran accepts inspection only after a final agreement. It is literally a dispute over the order of the steps, and it is because of it that bombs are still falling.
Second: the straits. Having lost its leader, its generals and its allies, closing the world’s oil route is the last real card Iran holds.
Third: Hezbollah’s weapons. On August 7 the Lebanese government decided to disarm all the militias in the country, and the army has until August 31 to deliver the plan. There are negotiations in Rome and Israeli strikes continuing at the same time, and Hezbollah is pressuring Lebanon to break off the talks.
Fourth: who rules Syria after Assad. And notice what is new: Israel’s prime minister, Netanyahu, warned Turkey before striking a Syrian air base. The vacuum left by Assad’s fall is not being filled by Iran, but contested by Israel and Turkey, two allies of Washington.
Fifth, and underneath everything: the survival of the regime. A government that has lost its Supreme Leader, its high command and its militia network needs to prove it still exists. That is why the truce fell in July. A regime that cannot strike back is a regime that falls, and those in power in Tehran know it better than anyone.
What may happen, and who ends up paying the bill
Can there be peace? · Stopping the shooting has already happened three times this year alone
It depends on what you call peace. Stopping the shooting, yes. It has already happened three times this year alone, and the shooting always comes back. Real peace is difficult, for three reasons.
The first is that the fight is not over a piece of land. Land can be divided. This fight is about whether the other has the right to exist as it is, and that cannot be split down the middle.
The second is that there is no single person to sign, because of that invention of fighting with other people’s hands. What good is signing peace with Hamas, if the enemy that funds it is Iran? What good is making peace with Iran, if Hezbollah still wants to keep up the fight? And so on…
The third is the most bitter, and it is new. After February, Iran gained the best argument in history for building the bomb. Libya gave up its nuclear program and the regime fell. Ukraine gave back the warheads it had inherited and was invaded. North Korea kept its own and no one touched it. The bombings set the program back and, at the same time, proved right those inside who argue for finishing it.
But not everything works against it. Four things have changed in its favor. The militia axis is finished. The regime has lost its own people. The neighboring Arab countries chose trade over war, to the point that the United Arab Emirates imposed a financial embargo on Tehran. And there is precedent: between 2015 and 2018, under the nuclear agreement, Iran signed and complied, with the atomic agency certifying compliance. That is not faith; it is track record.
My honest assessment: comprehensive peace, no. A verifiable agreement, yes, and it is arithmetically simple. Inspection and an enrichment limit in exchange for sanctions relief and a guarantee that no one will try to overthrow the regime. What is missing is not diplomatic engineering. It is trust, and trust is exactly what both sides have destroyed. The best realistic scenario is not called peace. It is called managed hostility: a cold war without a hot war, as Israel and Syria lived for fifty years. It is little. But it is the difference between people dying and people not dying.
Who suffers from this · Expensive fertilizer means expensive chicken, eggs and beef, and Brazil imports fertilizer
The damage is already greater for the neighbors than for the two enemies. Lebanon has had more than a sixth of its population displaced. Syria has become someone else’s game board. Iraq and Yemen have become battlefields for third parties. Egypt loses Suez Canal revenue every time the Red Sea becomes dangerous, and it is money it has no way of replacing. The Gulf countries that host American bases were targets of the retaliation and have their economies hanging on Hormuz, such as Qatar, the Emirates and others.
And it reaches all the way here to Brazil, even though no one does the math. Expensive oil means expensive fuel, expensive freight and expensive fertilizer. Brazil imports most of the fertilizer it consumes. Expensive fertilizer means expensive soybeans and corn, and that means expensive chicken, eggs and beef. A war 11,000 kilometers away reaches the neighborhood grocery store within a few months, and almost no one connects the one thing with the other.
Who can do something · China has the biggest lever, and that is exactly why it will not use it
China has the biggest lever on the planet over Tehran, because it buys most of the oil Iran manages to export. It is the money that keeps the regime alive. If Beijing stops, the revenue evaporates in weeks. Except it will not stop, because it buys at a heavy discount and profits from American distraction. The American sanctions announced this month, against “any country that does business with Iran,” have in practice a single addressee.
The United States is the only actor capable of punishing and guaranteeing at the same time. Only Washington has what Tehran really wants, which is sanctions relief and the security of the regime, and only Washington can hold back Israel’s arm. But “there will be no talks” is not a policy that produces an agreement; it is a policy that produces the next bombing. Oman and Qatar are the real mediators. Every channel that has worked since 2013 has passed through Muscat and Doha. They are small states whose only strength is being trusted by both sides, and that is why they are worth more than great powers. Russia has influence and no interest: a crisis in the Middle East raises the price of the oil it sells and takes the world’s attention off Ukraine. Europe and the international atomic agency are the technical mechanism. Without inspectors there is no agreement, there is a truce. And a truce always ends.
And the Iranian people, whom everyone forgets. In the long run, they are the only actor capable of ending this for good, because this war is a regime’s project and not a nation’s vocation. Regimes change.
What the Bible says about Persia, and what it gives no one the right to say
I counted verse by verse · There are 152, in 15 books, and Esther alone has 48
I made a complete sweep of Scripture, verse by verse, looking for every mention of Persia, Media, Elam, Susa (the Shushan of the King James Version), the Parthians and the Persian kings by name. The result: 152 verses, in 15 books. Esther has 48. Ezra has 39. Daniel has 19. Then come Nehemiah, Jeremiah, Isaiah, Genesis, Chronicles, Ezekiel, Haggai, Zechariah, 2 Kings and Acts. In other words, the territory of today’s Iran is one of the foreign places most often cited in the Bible, and there are whole books set inside it.
Why the Bible does not say “Iran” · The name dates from 1935, and the ground is exactly the same
Iran does not appear by that name because that name dates from 1935, when the shah asked foreign ministries to stop writing “Persia.” In other words, nothing changed in the territory; only the label changed. In Scripture that ground appears under four names: Persia, the empire of the plateau; Media, land of the Medes, in the northwest; Elam, in the southwest, the region of today’s Khuzestan, whose capital was Susa; and Parthia, only once.
Iran, then, is not a new name: it comes from Ērān, from the ancient Aryānām, and it already appears in the Sasanian inscriptions of the third century, in which the kings style themselves sovereigns of Ērānshahr, the kingdom of Iran. Iranians have called their own country by this name for more than one thousand seven hundred years. Persia, in turn, was born of an accident of Greek perspective: the dynasty of Cyrus came from the region of Pārsa, today’s province of Fars, and the Greeks called the whole by the name of the part, like someone who calls the whole United Kingdom England. We inherited the exonym through Herodotus and the classical tradition. There were, therefore, two names in simultaneous circulation for twenty-five centuries, Iran from within and Persia from without, and in 1935 the shah Reza Pahlavi merely asked that the outside name be brought into line with the inside one. Added to this were modernizing nationalism, because Persia evoked a dead empire and Iran evoked a modern state, and the desire to overcome regionalism, since Persia favored one province in a country of Azeris, Kurds, Arabs and Baluchis.
What this means for reading the Bible is decisive: Scripture does not speak of Iran because the name did not circulate in those languages, and not because it is a different people. It is the same ground and the same historical continuity.
Genesis · The first conqueror named in the Bible was a king of Elam, and a cousin of the Hebrews
The very first mention is not of war. It is of family.
The children of Shem; Elam, and Asshur, and Arphaxad, and Lud, and Aram.Genesis 10:22
In the table of nations, Elam is a son of Shem, the same Shem from whom Abraham descends. Genealogically, by Scripture’s own reckoning, the Elamites are Semites, cousins of the Hebrews. Four chapters later comes the second mention.
And it came to pass in the days of Amraphel king of Shinar, Arioch king of Ellasar, Chedorlaomer king of Elam, and Tidal king of nations…Genesis 14:1
Chedorlaomer, king of Elam, is the first conqueror named in the Bible. Five cities had paid him tribute for twelve years, and in the thirteenth they rebelled. He came down with three allied kings, won, plundered Sodom and carried off Lot, Abram’s nephew, as spoil. Notice what this means. The first war narrated in Scripture is against a king of the territory that today is called Iran. And it is this war that makes Abram take up arms for the only time in his life: he armed three hundred and eighteen men born in his house, pursued the coalition as far as Dan and rescued his nephew.
The rod in God’s hand · Part of the lost tribes was deported into Iranian territory
After Genesis, that territory reappears for centuries as an instrument of judgment. And the judgment falls on Israel. The first case is the hardest and the most forgotten. When Assyria destroyed the northern kingdom, the ten tribes were not deported only to Assyria (the account is repeated in 2 Kings 18:11):
In the ninth year of Hoshea the king of Assyria took Samaria, and carried Israel away into Assyria, and placed them in Halah and in Habor by the river of Gozan, and in the cities of the Medes.2 Kings 17:6
Part of God’s people was carried off into Iranian territory (the Medes), and there it disappeared from the biblical narrative. That is the source of many of the legends about the lost tribes, and it is also why, centuries later, there were still Jews scattered throughout that empire, as the book of Esther presupposes.
After that, Elam appears on the wrong side more than once. Isaiah sees it armed against Jerusalem, “Elam bare the quiver with chariots of men and horsemen” (Isaiah 22:6). Ezekiel lists the Persians among the mercenaries who served in the army of Tyre (Ezekiel 27:10). Jeremiah includes “all the kings of Elam, and all the kings of the Medes” among those who must drink the wine cup of fury (Jeremiah 25:25). And Ezekiel places them among the nations brought down: “There is Elam and all her multitude round about her grave” (Ezekiel 32:24). None of this is praise. Scripture does not romanticize that people.
The night of the banquet · The word written on the wall meant “divided” and “Persian” at the same time
And then comes one of the most famous scenes in the Bible. Belshazzar is at the banquet, drinking from the vessels plundered from the temple in Jerusalem, when a hand writes on the wall four words that no one can read. Daniel is called and translates:
This is the interpretation of the thing: MENE; God hath numbered thy kingdom, and finished it. TEKEL; Thou art weighed in the balances, and art found wanting. PERES; Thy kingdom is divided, and given to the Medes and Persians.Daniel 5:26–28
There is a wordplay in the original that is lost in translation: the root of PERES, to divide, is the same one that sounds like Paras, Persia. The word written on the wall was, at the same time, “divided” and “Persian.” And the text closes without circumlocution: “In that night was Belshazzar the king of the Chaldeans slain. And Darius the Median took the kingdom” (Daniel 5:30–31). The prophecy and its fulfillment are separated by four verses. It is exactly the night on which the study of Daniel in the lions’ den begins, a story that takes place within the newly installed Persian government.
Yet all of this had been announced more than a century before. Isaiah had written: “Behold, I will stir up the Medes against them, which shall not regard silver” (Isaiah 13:17), and before that “Go up, O Elam: besiege, O Media” (Isaiah 21:2). Jeremiah had repeated that “the LORD hath raised up the spirit of the kings of the Medes: for his device is against Babylon, to destroy it” (Jeremiah 51:11 and 51:28).
And then the rod became a shield · Cyrus is the only Gentile the Bible calls anointed
Here the theme changes sign, and it changes for good. Isaiah names the Persian king before he exists, and for a Gentile he uses two words that Scripture reserves for the covenant people:
That saith of Cyrus, He is my shepherd, and shall perform all my pleasure: even saying to Jerusalem, Thou shalt be built; and to the temple, Thy foundation shall be laid.Isaiah 44:28
Thus saith the LORD to his anointed, to Cyrus, whose right hand I have holden, to subdue nations before him; and I will loose the loins of kings, to open before him the two leaved gates; and the gates shall not be shut…Isaiah 45:1
“Anointed” is מָשִׁיחַ, mashiach, messiah. Cyrus is the only Gentile in the whole Bible to receive this title. Not because he was a believer, and the text even says he did not know the Lord, but because he was the chosen instrument. It is the same principle that appears in the study of Ephesus, when pagan authorities protect Paul without the slightest idea that they are serving a purpose that is not their own.
And the fulfillment is recorded with a date and paperwork:
Now in the first year of Cyrus king of Persia, that the word of the LORD by the mouth of Jeremiah might be fulfilled, the LORD stirred up the spirit of Cyrus king of Persia, that he made a proclamation throughout all his kingdom, and put it also in writing, saying…Ezra 1:1
And there is an archival detail worth a whole study. Years later, when enemies tried to halt the work by claiming there was no authorization, a search was ordered for the decree. And it was found:
And there was found at Achmetha, in the palace that is in the province of the Medes, a roll, and therein was a record thus written:Ezra 6:2
Achmetha is Ecbatana, the summer capital of the Persian kings. The document was kept in the state archive, and the decree commanded more than permission: it ordered the temple rebuilt at the expense of the royal treasury and the return of the gold and silver vessels that Nebuchadnezzar had taken (Ezra 6:3–5).
From then on, the Persian presence is everywhere at the end of the Old Testament. Darius confirms and pays. Artaxerxes sends Ezra and later Nehemiah, his cupbearer. Among those who return from exile there is an entire clan called “the children of Elam” (Ezra 2:7). And two whole prophetic books, Haggai and Zechariah, are dated by the regnal year of a Persian king (Haggai 1:1; Zechariah 1:1), which means that the calendar of God’s prophecy came to be counted by the clock of a foreign empire.
Esther and Daniel · The law not even the king could revoke throws one into the den and saves the other
Two books take place entirely on that ground, and both turn on the same legal mechanism. Daniel is in Susa when he receives the vision of the ram and the goat (Daniel 8:2), and it is in Susa that Esther lives. And in Daniel as in Esther the plot depends on a peculiarity of Persian law (Daniel 6:8; the same formula in Esther 1:19):
Now, O king, establish the decree, and sign the writing, that it be not changed, according to the law of the Medes and Persians, which altereth not.Daniel 6:8
In Daniel, it is what throws the prophet into the lions’ den, because not even the king, full of regret, can undo his own edict. In Esther, it is what prevents the simple annulment of the decree of extermination, forcing the king to issue a second decree authorizing the Jews to defend themselves. This mechanism, and the administrative reason behind it in an empire whose roads took months to travel, is unpacked in the study of Daniel 6.
And it is there, in Susa, that Haman devises the first recorded plan to exterminate all the Jews (Esther 3:8–13), in the same empire that a few decades earlier had set them free. The same territory appears, therefore, as liberator and as executioner, a few decades apart. And from this comes a principle that applies to every political reading done by Christians: no people has an eternal essence before God. Whoever wants to see how far this goes should read Isaiah 19:23–25, where God calls Egypt “my people” and Assyria “the work of my hands,” the two greatest historical oppressors of Israel.
There is still the layer most people skip. In Daniel 10:13 and 10:20, the heavenly messenger says he was withstood twenty-one days by the “prince of the kingdom of Persia,” and that when he goes forth he will have to face the prince of Grecia. It is one of the few windows Scripture opens onto the angelic conflict behind geopolitics. Whatever interpretation one adopts, the text teaches one thing without ambiguity: what you see in the news is not everything that is happening.
The promise no one preaches · The last word about that ground is not destruction
We have reached the end of the arc. The only prophecy in the Bible addressed specifically to that territory is Jeremiah 49:34–39, dated “in the beginning of the reign of Zedekiah,” around 597 BC. Its content is very harsh: God will break “the bow of Elam, the chief of their might,” will bring “the four winds from the four quarters of heaven,” and will scatter the Elamites in such a way that “there shall be no nation whither the outcasts of Elam shall not come.”
And then, in the last verse, the text turns:
But it shall come to pass in the latter days, that I will bring again the captivity of Elam, saith the LORD.Jeremiah 49:39
The last word of Scripture about that territory is not destruction. It is restoration. To “bring again the captivity” is the old English way of saying to bring the captives home. And it is not an isolated case: the same structure closes the prophecies against Moab and against Ammon, in the same block of Jeremiah, which shows it is a pattern of the prophet. Add to this Isaiah, who, in listing the places from which God will recover the remnant, includes that ground by name:
And it shall come to pass in that day, that the Lord shall set his hand again the second time to recover the remnant of his people, which shall be left, from Assyria, and from Egypt, and from Pathros, and from Cush, and from Elam, and from Shinar, and from Hamath, and from the islands of the sea.Isaiah 11:11
And the first sign of fulfillment is on the day the church was born. In the list of those who heard the gospel in Jerusalem, Luke opens with three peoples of that territory and, a few lines later, adds one more neighbor:
Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites, and the dwellers in Mesopotamia, and in Judæa, and Cappadocia, in Pontus, and Asia, Phrygia, and Pamphylia, in Egypt, and in the parts of Libya about Cyrene, and strangers of Rome, Jews and proselytes, Cretes and Arabians, we do hear them speak in our tongues the wonderful works of God.Acts 2:9–11
Read it slowly. Persians and Arabs were in the same room, on the first day of the church, hearing the same thing, each in his own language. Six centuries before the division that separates them today existed, the Holy Spirit had already placed them together, and without asking either of them to stop being what he was. It is the scene that opens the book of Acts, and the study of Acts 1 shows the promise that comes ten days before it.
The real headline · The fastest-growing church in the world is under those bombs
In 1979, when the revolution began, there were a few hundred Christians of Muslim background in Iran. Today estimates range from hundreds of thousands to more than a million, and the research organization Operation World points to the Iranian church as the fastest-growing evangelical movement in the world. These are fragile estimates by nature, because the church is clandestine and conversion is a crime. But the direction is unmistakable, and it happened under the regime most hostile to the gospel that country has ever had, in house churches, fed by radio, satellite and smuggled Scripture.
Notice what this means. In the country where religion took up arms and became the government, the official religion is the one losing the most people. And the gospel, which has no army there at all, is the one gaining the most. It is no coincidence: religious government produces atheists and produces converts, but it never produces faith.
So what does the church do? · Cheering for escalation is calling down fire on brothers and sisters
Something uncomfortable needs to be said.
There is a real temptation in certain pulpits, and it is to cheer for escalation, because the headline seems to confirm a prophetic scheme. We must name what this means: it is wishing for the death of real people to speed up a calendar that Jesus said does not belong to us. And there is a detail that should be enough to silence this cheering. The fastest-growing church in the world is under those bombs. A Brazilian Christian who calls for fire on Tehran is calling for fire on brothers and sisters.
What remains is less spectacular and more biblical. Paul commands that “supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks, be made for all men; For kings, and for all that are in authority,” and gives the purpose without any varnish: “that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty” (1 Timothy 2:1–2). The church prays for peace because peace is the environment in which the gospel runs. It is not sentimental pacifism; it is missionary strategy.
And the two commands do not cancel each other out: Psalm 122:6 commands us to pray for the peace of Jerusalem, and Matthew 5:44 commands us to pray for our enemies. The regime is not the people. Whoever only knows how to cheer, for one side or the other, is treating as a game what is survival for millions, and forgetting that there are brothers and sisters on both sides of the line of fire.
I close by recalling that this text was written so that, before the truth, you and I may walk in straight paths before the Lord: understanding where this conflict began, how it affects us and how we, as the church, should conduct ourselves in the face of these events.
Grace and peace.
Notes
1. In Twelver Shiite doctrine, the majority view in Iran, Muhammad al-Mahdi, the twelfth imam, was born in AD 869 and did not die: he entered ghayba (occultation), first the Minor (874–941), then the Major, which lasts to this day. This is not immortality by nature, but longevity granted by God; when he reappears (zuhur), he will reign and then die. Sunnis also await a Mahdi, but for them he is a future figure, not yet born. As for Jesus, the Quran denies the crucifixion (4:157), states that God raised him to himself (4:158) and calls him a sign of the Hour (43:61), but does not describe a return to reign: that doctrine (nuzul al-Masih) comes from the hadith, collections of traditions attributed to Muhammad compiled in the eighth and ninth centuries, and in them Jesus descends as a Muslim, prays behind the Mahdi and confirms Islam. The contrast with the biblical text is head-on: the cross is not an appearance, but the foundation (Romans 5:8; 1 Corinthians 15:17); the return is of Christ himself, not of an auxiliary (Acts 1:11); and the kingdom is his, without intermediary (Revelation 11:15). Philippians 2:9–11 sheds light on the difference: in Islam Jesus bows before the imam; there, it is before Jesus that every knee bows.
2. The White Revolution was a top-down modernization program, approved by referendum in January 1963. It began with six points and grew to nineteen, including land reform, women’s suffrage, the nationalization of forests and pastures, worker profit-sharing and the Literacy Corps. The logic was preventive: reform from the throne before the left reformed against it. Khomeini’s opposition had distinct motives. In land reform, the most concrete: religious institutions were large landowners through the waqf, perpetual endowments whose income sustained seminaries, mosques and the clergy’s welfare network, so that striking at the land was striking at the clergy’s financial autonomy. In women’s suffrage, the underlying objection was to the source of authority, that is, who may redefine the legal status of women, the clergy or a secular monarch; a sign of this is that after 1979 the regime kept women’s suffrage and mobilized women politically, but abolished the family courts. In secularization lay the real core: education, family justice and civil registration passed from the clergy to the state, and the replacement of the Islamic calendar with a pre-Islamic imperial calendar signaled an Iran defined as an ancient Persian nation, not as a Muslim community. In 1963 Khomeini did not yet advocate velayat-e faqih, which he would formulate in Najaf around 1970: he spoke as an ayatollah defending the clergy’s sphere, a position that was conventional at the time. An irony the reform left on record: divided into small plots and without credit, it caused a rural exodus to the outskirts of Tehran, forming the poor urban population that would take to the streets in 1979. It is the pattern Samuel had warned Israel about when they asked for a king “like all the nations”: the king would take from their fields, their vineyards and their sons (1 Samuel 8:5; 8:14–17).
3. A scandal of the Reagan administration, revealed in November 1986 by the Lebanese magazine Ash-Shiraa, which joined two secret operations. On the Iranian end, the United States maintained an arms embargo on Iran and proclaimed that it did not negotiate with terrorists, but between 1985 and 1986 it secretly sold TOW antitank missiles and parts for HAWK missiles to Khomeini’s regime, then at war with Iraq, so that Iran would pressure Hezbollah to free American hostages in Lebanon; Israel served as intermediary in the first shipments. On the Nicaraguan end, the profit from those sales was diverted to fund the Contras, guerrillas fighting the Sandinista government, which was prohibited by the Boland Amendment passed by Congress. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, of the National Security Council, emerged as the central operator and destroyed documents; fourteen people were indicted, and George H. W. Bush granted pardons in 1992. Two details matter to this story. The first is that, six years after the revolution and the hostage crisis at the embassy, Israel was delivering American weapons to the regime that chanted slogans against it, a sign that the hostility was declared but did not prevent business. The second is that the hostages whose release was being negotiated were in the hands of Hezbollah, created three years earlier with Iranian instructors: the proxy structure also served as diplomatic currency.
4. An arm of the sea between Iran, to the north, and Oman together with the United Arab Emirates, to the south, linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and from there to the Indian Ocean. It is the gulf’s only outlet to the sea, and close to a fifth of all the oil consumed in the world passes through it, besides a significant share of liquefied natural gas, above all Qatar’s. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the Emirates, Qatar and Iran itself depend on this passage to export. The vulnerability lies in the geography: the strait is about 33 kilometers wide at its narrowest part, and the safe shipping lanes are much narrower than that, a few kilometers in each direction, so that there is no comparable alternative route. Some pipelines bypass the gulf, in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, but they carry only a fraction of the volume. Hence the common saying that Hormuz is the most important chokepoint on the planet. Closing it, however, is a double-edged weapon: Iran ships its own oil through it, which is its main source of revenue, and it would harm the Gulf neighbors whose neutrality is useful to it, besides provoking an almost certain international military response. That is why the threat has recurred in Iranian rhetoric since the 1980s, in the so-called tanker war against Iraq, and has never turned into a prolonged blockade. It works less as a plan and more as an instrument of pressure: the mere possibility already moves the price of a barrel, and that is what explains the jump from about 70 to 103 dollars mentioned above.